Verlag Barbara Budrich

Chapter Title: Measuring, Exhibiting, and Mobilizing Tolerance in Berlin
Chapter Author(s): Barış Ülker

Book Title: Doing Tolerance
Book Subtitle: Urban Interventions and Forms of Participation
Book Editor(s): María do Mar Castro Varela, Barış Ülker
Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich. (2020)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv10h9f87.5

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms



This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Funding is provided by Knowledge Unlatched.



Verlag Barbara Budrich is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Doing Tolerance*

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

I Conceptual Reflections

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1 Measuring, Exhibiting, and Mobilizing Tolerance in Berlin

Barış Ülker

Since 2002, the Jewish Museum Berlin and the Friends and Patrons of the Museum have honored business people, cultural figures and politicians with the "Award for Understanding and Tolerance" on an annual basis. In presenting the award to Helmut Panke, the former chairman of BMW (the German multinational automobile and motorcycle manufacturer) in 2006, German Chancellor Angela Merkel underscored that tolerance is not arbitrariness; rather, it is the ability to have serious dialogue with others, to accept that others think differently and to consider them an asset (Merkel 2006: 3–4). Following this utilitarian perspective, she complicated the definition of this already complicated concept by bringing in its opposite.

Merkel argued—echoing the liberal tradition (Popper 2013; Rawls 2005; Walzer 1997)—that there should be zero tolerance for intolerance and clear boundaries against those who reject the existence of a plural society, or who disrespect those that think differently, have a different skin color, or have different beliefs (Merkel 2006: 4). In that sense, she described tolerance by means of its limits: intolerance. Although an intolerance of xenophobia and anti-Semitism appeared to be a clear-cut theme throughout Merkel's talk, her emphasis on tolerance remained ambiguous, as she pointed to the concept—in reference to BMW's intercultural education initiatives, the integration of handicapped people into the labor force, and violence prevention programs for children and young people—as needing to be learned and practiced (ibid.: 3).

In 2011, five years after this talk, Merkel would herself receive the same award, but her examples and ways of defining tolerance remained as unclear as before, allowing one to wonder about the features of this concept. What is tolerance and who defines tolerance? How can tolerance be taught? Can tolerance be exhibited? What are the defining features of being tolerant and tolerated? Have the values associated with tolerance changed through time and space? Can the same individual be tolerant, tolerated, and not tolerated? How can tolerance be measured? Who benefits from tolerance? How can society be mobilized for the development of tolerance? Is the use of tolerance in everyday life inevitable or are other suggestions possible, thus avoiding its usage?

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Etymologically, 'tolerate' comes from the Latin word tolero and means to sustain, endure, tole, allow to exist, and suffer (Hoad 1996: 497; Wedgwood 1872: 686); 'tolerance,' from the Latin word *tolerantia*, refers to endurance, fortitude, and a disposition towards indulgence. Tolerance appears in German around the sixteenth century from the same Latin root and implies *Duldsamkeit* (forbearance, indulgence) (Pfeifer et al. 1989). Broadly speaking, tolerance does not exist without suffering.[1] It is about a conditional acceptance of certain practices, which are understood to be incorrect but manageable. It implies a power relationship between the tolerating party and the tolerated person(s) or thing(s). There is a hidden dislike, inquiry, challenge, and conflict.

Based on this brief conceptual framework, this chapter examines how certain practices and narratives are used by public and private institutions to contribute to the formation of an urban space associated with tolerance. In so doing, the chapter explores the attempts made by public and private institutions in Berlin to measure, exhibit, and develop networks of tolerance, as well as the positioning of the tolerating and tolerated parties. It focuses on Berlin as a case study, for its reputation as the city of tolerance in Germany, especially after the fall of the Wall (Biskup and Schalenberg 2008; Colomb 2012; Berlin Partner GmbH 2018).

The chapter is divided into four parts: In the first part, to analyze one of the ways of measuring tolerance, I look at the main arguments of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung), which developed an index of tolerance (together with indexes of talent and technology—following economist Richard Florida's arguments about creative industries) in Germany. The second part considers the ways in which tolerance has been displayed in four temporary exhibitions of the German Historical Museum (Deutsches Historisches Museum, DHM) of Berlin: *Zuwanderungsland Deutschland: Die Hugenotten* (Germany as a Land of Arrival: The Huguenots)*, Zuwanderungsland Deutschland: Migrationen 1500–2005* (Germany as a Land of Arrival: Migrations, 1500–2005), *Fremde? Bilder von den "Anderen" in Deutschland and Frankreich seit 1871* (Foreigners? Images of 'Others' in Germany and France since 1871), and *Immer Bunter: Einwanderungsland Deutschland* (Multicultural: Germany, a Country of Immigration). In part three, I point out the reasons for developing networks of tolerance, by analyzing the activities of two organizations: Bündnis für

[1] It is not within the scope of this chapter to look at present theoretical approaches or the historical development of this concept in Germany and Europe. For an introduction into these issues, see Forst (2013), Heyd (1996), Stepan and Taylor (2014), Wolff, Moore and Marcuse (1965), Dobbernack and Modood (2013), Brown (2006), and Žižek (2008).

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Demokratie und Toleranz gegen Extremismus und Gewalt (Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance against Extremism and Violence), and Initiative Hauptstadt Berlin e. V. (Initiative for Capital City Berlin). The chapter ends with a critical analysis of the practices and narratives of tolerance in Berlin.

Measuring Tolerance

As an independent thinktank, the Berlin Institute for Population and Development conducts research on global demographic changes and development policies, as well as generating reports, discussion papers, and handbooks (BIfBE 2018). The Institute's purpose is laid out on three interrelated levels: as an academic organization, to inform journalists and interested citizens about demographic constellations and their relevance for daily life; as a policy advisor to discuss and develop solutions for sustainable development; and as a public information office to introduce demography (in relation to education, migration, integration, work, health, and environment) to the population as an important issue, as well as prepare society for reforms. The board of directors, the scientific advisory board and the central office are all composed of experts and scholars from various disciplines and fields.

The Institute was established in 2000 with the support of the Falk and Marlene Reichenbach Foundation (Hanover, Germany) and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (California, the USA) (BIfBE 2011: 8). Since then, the Institute has received financial backing through research contracts, project grants, and donations from influential institutions.[2] As a result, the Berlin Institute for

[2] Robert Bosch Stiftung; Generali Zukunftsfonds; Software AG Stiftung; Erste Stiftung; Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG; Merck Serono; Stiftung Mercator; Vodafone Stiftung; Futur 2 – Stiftung Kulturelle Erneuerung; Stiftung Schloss Ettersburg; GfK-Nürnberg e. V.; Adecco Institute; Adolf Würth GmbH and Co. KG; Ahorn-Grieneisen AG; Prof. Dr. Dr. Andreas Barner; Bankhaus Hallbaum AG; BHF-Bank Aktiengesellschaft; BMW Stiftung Herbert Quandt Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH; Degussa AG; Deutsche Bank AG; Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt; Firma Erhard Sachse; Fondazione Monte De Paschi Di Siena; Gerda-Henkel-Stiftung; Jeannette und Michael Saalfeld Stiftung; Heidelberg Cement; Münchner Rück Stiftung; Pfizer Europe; Union Stiftung; the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth; the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development; the European Commission; the Ministry of Interior Brandenburg; the Chambers of Commerce and Industry Schwaben and Ulm; KfW Entwicklungsbank; Fachagentur Nachwachsende Rohstoffe e. V.; the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ); and the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (Potsdam) e. V.

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Population and Development has become one of the few thinktanks that is able to conduct such a variety of research projects through third-party funding.

Tolerance appeared as a topic in one of the Institute's early studies, sponsored by the Robert Bosch Foundation, entitled *Talent, Technology and Tolerance: Where is Germany's Future?* (Kröhnert, Morgenstern and Klingholz 2007). By investigating differences in economic power and employment opportunities among German federal states, the study attempted to illustrate the economic potential in Germany, which is supposedly reliant on political and social conditions, such as economic incentives, the level of bureaucracy and the number of creative people (ibid.: 3). Rather than looking at traditional indicators like the gross domestic product and per capita income, the study was based on Richard Florida's creative class theory. Since it is the only existing model for measuring tolerance used in Berlin and other German federal states, it is crucial here to focus on the main arguments of Florida's theory, before moving on to the findings of Berlin Institute's study.

Broadly speaking, Florida argues that cities that are able to attract the creative class are more likely to develop economically in an era of intense international competition (2012). The creative class, for him, is composed of two groups: a super-creative core and creative professionals. The former refers to those who directly produce new forms and designs and consists of scientists, researchers, engineers, university professors, poets, novelists, artists, actors, architects, designers and cultural figures (Ibid.: 38). The latter works in knowledge-intensive industries, financial services, legal and health professions and business management (ibid.: 39). In a broader framework,

> the creativity thesis […] argues that the role of culture is much more expansive, that human beings have limitless potential, and that the key to economic growth is to enable and unleash that potential. This unleashing requires an open culture—one that does not discriminate, does not force people into boxes, allows us to be ourselves, and validates various forms of family and of human identity. In this sense, culture operates not by constraining the range of human creative possibilities but by facilitating and mobilizing them. By extension, open culture on the macro level is a spur to societal innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic development (Florida 2005: 5–6).

Three particular values, Florida continues, are shared by members of the creative class (2012: 56–58): first, individuality, self-expression, and reluctance to traditional group-oriented norms; second, meritocracy, propensity for achievement, and self-determination; third, diversity, openness, and tolerance. Put differently, he assumes that creativity understood as the ability to produce

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

new knowledge within economically thriving practices is the key resource for economic development.

Following this line of thought, Florida introduces a creativity index that is composed of technology, talent, and tolerance (ibid.: 228). These 3Ts, he claims, are the main factors necessary for understanding the new economic geography of creativity. Each of them is necessary for economic prosperity:

> Tolerance and diversity clearly matter to high-technology concentration and growth. Talented people go to places that have thick labor markets, are open and tolerant, and offer a quality of life they desire. And the more diverse and culturally rich, the more attractive they are. Places that attract companies and generate new innovations, and this leads to a virtuous circle of economic growth (Florida 2005: 137–139).

Although Florida's arguments about the creative class may sound encouraging to economic development-oriented agencies, politicians and social scientists, they have also generated a great deal of discussion and critique (Marcuse 2003; Peck 2005; Krätke 2010). That being said, his conceptualization of tolerance has received very limited attention and has only appeared as part of the analysis on social class, technology, the growth of cities, and mode of capitalist development. It is thus essential to look at how this—hard to measure and use—concept found its place in the study of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development through Florida's formulation.

Florida does not provide a philosophically or historically grounded definition of tolerance. In basic terms, tolerance is a way of openness to diversity and a constituent part of economic performance (Florida 2012: 231–232). He underlines that there is a connection between

> a metropolitan area's level of tolerance for a range of people, its ethnic and social diversity, and its success in attracting talented people, including high-technology workers. People in technology businesses are drawn to places known for diversity of thought and open-mindedness—places with low barriers to entry for human capital (Florida 2005: 130).

To measure tolerance, he used the Composite Diversity Index (CDI), which combines the Gay Index (the percentage of homosexuals in a given population), the Melting Pot Index (the percentage of immigrants in a given population), and the Bohemian Index (the percentage of authors, artists, directors, musicians, designers and photographers in a given population). For the updated edition of his book, an Integration Index (a measurement of the level of racial integration versus separation in a metropolitan area) was also added to the CDI.

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Derived from Florida's index, the Berlin Institute for Population and Development created its own Tolerance Index. The measurement of tolerance took place in 2000 and 2005. This index was composed of four indicators: the percentage of votes for the far-right parties in the 2005 federal election, the percentage of foreigners within the population, the percentage of xenophobic statements, and the Bohemian index (the percentage of employees who are artistically active). First, the percentage of foreigners was highest in the city-states of Hamburg, Berlin, and Bremen, followed by federal states like Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westphalia; the former federal states of the German Democratic Republic (except East Berlin) were at the bottom. In terms of the second indicator, the percentage of far-right parties was highest in the former federal states of the GDR (except East Berlin), followed by the federal states of southern Germany. The trend repeated itself, to a certain extent, in the ranking of the cases of confirmed xenophobic statements. On the Bohemian index, the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen were at the top; Bayern and other former West German states settled in the middle, while the former East German states and the northern Western federal states ranked lowest. In the general tolerance index, Berlin and Hamburg ended up in first and second place. Bremen, North Rhein-Westphalia, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bavaria had a moderate level of tolerance. The lowest ranking was shared by Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Thuringia, and Saxony.

In this context, a general tendency can be underlined in this study. The Bohemian index, echoing Florida's promotion of classic pioneers of gentrification (Peck 2005; Smith 2002), had a limited impact on the operationalization of tolerance by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, since only employed artists were included, without taking the conditions and results of the market economy, such as social polarization, into consideration. As such, the target of tolerance becomes, to a larger extent, the migrant groups living in reunified Germany. In other words, as a policy recommendation, this study creates a regime of truth about tolerance and asks for practices and narratives that tolerate migrants to encourage the future economic development of the federal states. As Foucault appropriately puts it, this regime of truth is

> centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

> certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); finally, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ("ideological" struggles) (2000: 131).

This regime of truth about tolerance, generated by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development based on Florida's conceptualization, is part of the power relations between the tolerant host and its tolerated migrants. The practices and narratives of this conditional acceptance—tolerance—do not differentiate and categorize the migrants; rather they provide the basis for arbitrariness. The position of the tolerated migrant is inevitably open for negotiation and compromise since there is no guarantee of the definition and the continuity of these values. Therefore, any contingency can change the value given to this position (tolerated migrant) and results in the creation of a 'not tolerated' migrant, simply because they might be unemployed, less educated, unskilled, or unhealthy.

Within the formulations of contemporary liberalism promoted by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development and others, migrants are subject to a particular regime of truth about tolerance and its transformations, which recalls Aihwa Ong's conceptualization of flexible citizenship. In exploring transnational Chinese subjects in relation to their cultural practices, the nation-state, and capitalism, Ong introduces the concept of flexible citizenship, which refers to

> the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. In their request to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relations to markets, governments, and cultural regimes (1999: 6).

Ong formulates her conceptualization with reference to international managers, technocrats, professionals and particularly to entrepreneurs. However, the flexible and mobile position of entrepreneurs is not unlimited nor able to completely transcend the regulatory power of the state, economic markets, and cultural regimes. In other words, although these subjects are able to escape localization by state authorities, they are never free from the regulations of the state, market operations and cultural regimes (ibid.: 19). As a result, dynamics of discipline (such as the localization of disciplinary subjects) and escape (the emphasis on the flexibility and mobility of subjects) reinforce each other and create the terrain of flexible citizenship. In this sense, Ong, quoting Foucault,

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

defines the term regime as normalization of power relations through the system of power/knowledge. These power/knowledge systems condition, normalize and regulate subjects' attitudes and behaviors by reinforcing various forms of truths in culture, science, economy and so forth. Moreover, these regimes require the "localization of disciplinary subjects, that is, it requires that persons be locatable and confinable to specific spaces and relations defined by various regimes: the kinship network, the 'nation', the marketplace" (ibid.: 113). In line with Ong's formulation, one can argue that tolerated migrants in Berlin are conditioned, normalized and regulated within the regimes of truth generated by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (which were themselves derived from Florida's conceptualization).

Exhibiting Tolerance

According to the International Council of Museums (ICOM, founded in 1946) Statutes, a museum is "a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment" (2018). In various European countries, promoting migrant integration policies and cultural diversity through migration museums has become a key objective since the mid-2000s (IOM and UNESCO 2006). Two arguments seem to dominate the discussions on migration museums (Baur 2009 and 2010). First, are these museums able to tell the story of groups of people who have been underrepresented in that society? Second, do they segregate the stories of migrants or migration from mainstream history? In regards to the second question, the national museums have also reflected on different aspects of migration and emphasized the importance of treating migrants with tolerance in their temporary exhibitions.

Although treating migrants with tolerance in the narratives of German national museums is a recent phenomenon, it cannot be understood without considering the immigration processes that have occurred in the country since the World War II: German refugees, expellees and deportees; the so-called guest-workers; asylum seekers and other refugees; ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe; Jews from the former Soviet Union; Roma refugees from eastern Europe; and asylum seekers from the Middle East, Asia and Africa since the beginning of the 21st century. In managing the presence of migrants, three general types of incorporation processes have been utilized: differential exclusion (e.g. guest-worker programs and undocumented labor patterns), assimilation, and multiculturalism (Schierup/Hansen and Castles 2006: 40–45).

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Therefore, exhibiting tolerance towards migrants within the context of German national museums must be rooted in these types of incorporation processes, which emphasize the relationships between the tolerant host and its migrants.

The visualization of migrants through temporary exhibitions provides the basis for the continuous interpretation of guests, strangers, or others. According to Emanuel Levinas, one encounters others at a particular moment (1969); it is this moment that makes the interaction with the other concrete because it is based on physical presence and a face-to-face relationship. This face-to-face encounter at a specific moment indicates the impossibility of dominating the other's thoughts.

> The face resists possession, resists my powers…The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power…the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge (Levinas 1969: 197–198).

In a way, such a visualization of migrants in German national museums generates a narrative about the other's limitlessness or being in time without an end—a narrative based on the complex relationship between space and cultural difference. As Henri Lefebvre puts it, groups of people have the capacity to produce their own space through various conflicts, negotiations, and interactions (1991). Space cannot be reduced mere participation in production, exchange and accumulation dynamics. As a product of social relations, space has a determining power on the reproduction of wealth and surplus-value. The produced space is an instrument that has an impact on our thoughts and actions. It is an efficient mechanism of control, domination, and power (ibid.: 26).

Space, for Lefebvre, can be analyzed by relying on three axes, namely perceived, conceived, and lived spaces. Although they refer to different spatial indicators, they are all related to each other. Perceived space derives from everyday social life and it is measurable. Conceived space, on the contrary, comes from thinking and ideas, developed within a cognitive process that is often related to the formulations of planners, technocrats and social engineers. Lived space, however, is a complex set of symbols and images, which has the capacity to determine the balance between perceived and conceived spaces. From a Lefebvrian perspective, the relationships between the tolerant host and its migrants are therefore subject to continuous struggles over space; these struggles cannot be considered as fixed entities, but part of social construction (see also Castro Varela and Haghighat in this volume). It is illustrative here to look at four temporary exhibitions at the German Historical Museum (DHM) in Berlin to further elaborate on the relationships between the tolerant host

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

and its migrants, within the context of a spatialized understanding of cultural difference.

The first two temporary exhibitions took place in the DHM at the same time (between October 2005 and February 2006) under the general heading of Zuwanderungsland Deutschland (Germany as a Land of Arrival). The first temporary exhibition, entitled *Die Hugenotten* (The Huguenots), was focused on the migration of French Protestants, who escaped from France after the revocation of the Toleration Edict of Nantes in 1685 by Louis XIV and settled in the protestant countries of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as in England and Holland. Divided into eight rooms on one floor, the exhibition brought together different aspects of the story: questions of belief (1), Protestantism in France (2), on the run or in hiding (3), the reception of refugees (4), French colonies (5), the businesses of Huguenots (6), integration of the "French" (7), and the history of Huguenots in retrospect (8). The exhibition also included a history workshop, targeted at young people, which through different sessions, interrogated the questions of 'us' and 'others.'

Broadly speaking, this exhibition reflected on the idea of tolerance from three perspectives: the intolerant former host (France), the tolerant new hosts (the protestant countries of the Holy Roman Empire, England, and Holland), and the tolerated migrants. Although the policies of the previous and the new hosts were included in the exhibition and its publication (Beneke and Ottomeyer 2005), one decisive element was not afforded a critical standpoint: the characteristics of this group of individuals themselves, including their high qualifications, their technical and cultural innovations, and the possible economic contributions they might make in the new country. Put differently, economic interests played a large role in the treatment of this group by the political rationality through tolerance. This kind of political rationality legitimized itself through the mercantilist policies of the sixteenth to the middle of eighteenth century, a particular organization of production and commercial circuits. Mercantilism was based on the idea that the state developed through monetary accumulation, increasing population, and continuous competition at the expense of other states (in short, a zero-sum game). It was within this framework that these skilled migrants were imagined as a perfect example of the tolerated other.

The second temporary exhibition, under the heading of Zuwanderungsland Deutschland (Germany as a Land of Arrival), was entitled *Migrationen* (Migrations) *1500–2005*. Although it covered a longer period of time and a greater number of migration waves than *Die Hugenotten* exhibition, *Migrationen* was also exhibited one floor. It was divided chronologically across eight rooms: the early modern period, 1500–1800 (1); German confederation 1815–1870 (2); the German empire, 1871–1918 (3); World War I,

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1914–1918, and the Weimar Republic, 1918–1933 (4); Nazi Germany and World War II, 1933–1945 (5); the German Democratic Republic, GDR (6); the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG (7), and Germany since 1990 (8). Unlike *Die Hugenotten*, this exhibition dealt with particular categories of migrants in those periods (Beier-de Haan 2005): Dutch, Bohemian and Salzburg religious refugees; Jews in the early modern period; Ottomans in southern Germany; merchants from Lake Como (Italy); wandering craftsmen and servants from Central Europe; the exclusion of sedentary people, and the exclusion and persecution of 'Gypsies' (1); migrant workers from Eichfeld and seasonal workers from Lippe (2); agricultural workers from the eastern Prussian provinces to the West, Italian and Dutch workers, 'Ruhr Poles,' peasant children from poor families from the Austrian and Swiss Alps to farms in Swabia, Eastern Jews (3); prisoners of war and civilian workers, such as Russian-Polish seasonal workers, refugees from Bolshevik Russia, ethnic German 'returnees,' and Jews from Eastern Europe (4); displaced persons, refugees and expellees (5); contract and foreign workers in the GDR (6); refugees from the GDR and guest-workers in the FRG (7); and seasonal workers from eastern Europe, repatriates, and Jewish contingent refugees (8). As the first detailed exhibition in Berlin on the various histories of migration, the DHM clearly classified and coded migrants. Without questioning the discontinuity of space, it placed migrants into different cultural categories, which were reflected in the hierarchies of tolerance produced by the political rationality of the tolerant host.

The third temporary exhibition, Fremde? Bilder von den „Anderen" in Deutschland und Frankreich *seit 1871* (Foreigners? Images of "Others" in Germany and France since 1871) took place in Berlin between October 2009 and February 2010 with the cooperation of the DHM and the Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration (Paris). It was divided into different historical periods across two floors. On the first floor, the exhibit covered 1871–1914, 1914–1918, 1918–1933, 1933–1945 for Germany and 1871–1914, 1914–1918, 1918–1940, 1940–1945 for France. On the second floor, the exhibit continued with 1945–1970, 1970–1989, 1989–2009 for Germany and 1945–1970, 1970–1983, 1983–2009 for France. By comparing Germany and France, the exhibition aimed to challenge existing clichés about "others," the conception of ethnically homogenous nation-states and about national borders in the process of globalization and European integration (Beier-de Haan and Werquet 2009). The exhibition was organized to underline how the 'others' were imagined through a variety of media. Yet, the exhibition did not question how these imaginaries are associated with structural racism and the socio-spatial structure of capitalism in Europe (Wallerstein 1979). When considering the concept of tolerance, this exhibition recalls two strategies that in/tolerant hosts can develop in dealing with its 'others' (Lévi-Strauss 1992). On the one hand, the other, the

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

deviant, or the stranger has to be incorporated into the self. Following Claude Lévi-Strauss, this strategy is about minimizing the boundaries between the self and the other, through various means of incorporation, such as cannibalism, genocide, massacre, assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism. On the other hand, the other has to be excluded from the self. This second strategy, which forces the others into isolation, can function through strong boundaries and special institutions, by erecting walls, increasing border controls, creating gated communities, and constructing concentration and refugee camps. However, similar to the first exhibition, this second temporary exhibition remained limited in its critique of the discontinuity of space and the positioning of migrants into cultural categories.

In their attempt to circumvent the production of a binary opposition between 'us' and 'others,' these paired exhibitions ignored the concept of crisis, which seems to be the basis for the treatment of migrants through in/tolerance. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the concept of crisis derives from the Greek verb *krino*: to separate, select, judge, decide and fight (2006: 358). Maintaining a central place in the Greek political sphere, this term was used first to underscore not only 'the quarrel' inherent to a battle but also 'the decision' that tipped the scales towards a particular outcome. In the legal sphere, it implied a verdict or a judgment. As such, the term was able to encompass both 'subjective critique' and 'objective crisis' (ibid.: 359). From this legal meaning, the term expanded into decisions of war and peace, electoral decisions, and government decisions, and set up a balance between justice and political order. Further, in the sphere of theology, crisis signified the Last Judgement, which would bring about true justice, impacting everyone since it was "already taking place within one's conscience" (ibid.: 359–360). Appearing as a cosmic event, crisis provided the ground for eternal life. Finally, in the sphere of medicine, crisis referred to the observable illness and to the judgment about the course which that condition would take (ibid.: 360). Put it differently, it referred to a decisive moment during which one could determine whether the patient was going to live or die.

From a historical perspective, Koselleck underlines that the concept of crisis includes the element of time, an awareness of uncertainty, and the obligation to forecast the future (2002: 240–244). Koselleck proposes three semantic models of crisis (ibid.: 16): First, in order to challenge the idea of a singular form of progress, history should be seen as a continual crisis. Second, order restructures itself under new conditions following a crisis, thereby pointing to the crisis as the end of a period. Third, the concept of crisis is future-oriented, focused on a final resolution of conflict. As a result, relying on Koselleck's analysis, it becomes clear that, in these two temporary exhibitions, migrants/others are depicted as the product of a crisis and that theses crises reproduced the

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

relationships between the tolerant host and in/tolerated migrants in numerous ways.

The fourth temporary exhibition, *Immer Bunter: Einwanderungsland Deutschland* (Multicultural: Germany, a Country of Immigration), took place on one floor of the DHM from May to October 2016 at the initiation of the Haus der Geschichte (House of History) Foundation. Conceptually, this final temporary exhibition builds upon the first two and can thus be regarded as an extension of the discussion surrounding migration in Germany—a decade later. Unlike the previous two, this temporary exhibition's narrative began with the arrival of the guest-workers and ended with the arrival of the refugees after 2015. In order to elucidate concepts such as integration, assimilation, identity, nationality, interaction with foreign cultures and religions, parallel societies, xenophobia, and Islamophobia in relation to different periods, the exhibition was divided into six parts: guest-workers (1), a new home abroad (2), reluctant country of immigration (3), foreigners in the GDR (4), the Federal Republic transformed (5), and A New Germany? (6). According to the exhibition, while German society has become multicultural and developed the means to treat its migrants and their values with tolerance, this endeavor produced conflicts, which necessitated an agreement between state and society on the rules of co-existence and the limits of tolerance (SHGBD 2016). Similar to previous exhibitions, it pointed out the discontinuity of space and placing of migrants into cultural categories.

According to Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, this uniqueness of societies, nations, and cultures derives from an unproblematic division of space, which privileges its discontinuity (1992: 33–36). That is to say, each country denotes a specific culture and society, which are then attached to the names of nation-states. This isomorphism of space, place, and culture inevitably creates problems, however, in terms of understanding and conceptualizing the inhabitants of border areas, cultural differences within a locality, hybrid cultures of post-coloniality and social change within interconnected spaces. Identities are not fixed to naturally discontinuous spaces (ibid.: 38–39). In this framework, it is essential to look first at the construction of place and homeland by mobile and displaced people, and second at the embeddedness of place in political-economic conditions. Gupta and Ferguson thus criticize the spatialized understanding of cultural difference and the unproblematic distinction of "us" and "others" (ibid.: 42). What needs to be explored instead is the "processes of production of difference in a world of culturally, socially and economically interconnected and interdependent spaces" (ibid.: 43).

Examining the notions of hybridization, creolization, and hyphenation from a similar perspective, Ayşe Çağlar challenges the conceptualization of culture as a homogenized and bounded entity (1997: 169–170). Although the

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

concepts of hybridization and creolization are assumed to produce new forms of boundary-crossing that go beyond hierarchies of difference, they remain in fixed territorial ideas and take for granted a prior ontological difference between cultures (ibid.: 173). The understandings of hybrid/creolized/hyphenated identities do not dissociate culture from territory; rather, they presume the existence of *a priori* spatialized communities and then naturalize this spatialization. Additionally, hyphenated identities overlap 'culture,' 'nation' and 'community' and thus simultaneously produce a spatialization of ethnicities and problematize potential conflicts within these associations (ibid.: 175). As a result, multiculturalism—taking culture as the constitutive element of a collective right to self-determination—emphasizes the need to secure the survival of cultural communities based on differences and thus fails to avoid the idea of spatialized communities (ibid.: 179).

Networking for Tolerance

Appropriation of different forms of capital as resources, Pierre Bourdieu argues, is decisive in the formation of social groups (1986). In his line of thought, capital does not merely represent an economic unit, but also an array of symbolic, cultural, and social indicators. Economic capital is institutionalized in property rights; cultural capital in educational qualifications; social capital (social network) in the form of status; and symbolic capital is the power to impose the social order (ibid.: 242–244). In particular, social capital becomes one of the most influential mechanisms for the development and promotion of the concept of tolerance.

In general, a social network or social capital reflects benefits derived from relations of mutual trust and collaboration, and thus depends upon the relations between members of a group (Coleman 1988). Social networks are "those resources that help people or groups to achieve their goals in ties and the assets inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to cooperate in networks and organizations, serving as a mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities" (Faist 2000: 102). They unavoidably ease transactions and facilitate cooperation through three mechanisms: obligations as a pattern of social exchange, reciprocity as a social norm, and solidarity-based on collective representations (Faist 2000: 104–111).

The first mechanism, degree of trust to other actors, functions by seeing the actual number of obligations and kind of services rendered in the past as substantial elements and can best be represented in market transactions, such as the allocation of scarce resources and the distribution of outputs among immigrant entrepreneurs. Second, reciprocity as a social norm refers to the

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

exchange of roughly equivalent values, which depends on the prior actions of the other. In this sense, good is returned for good and bad for bad (ibid.: 105). Thus, there is a control over malfeasance or trust among members of a group. Third, solidarity among members of a group who share similar social and symbolic ties sparks the development of a collective identity. Although solidarity is institutionalized within the concept of citizenship, the decoupling of rights and identity (or of the state and the nation) allows people to define themselves with means of several identities and to acquire dual citizenship. Thus, solidarity as an indicator of collective identity does not have to be defined within the boundaries of the nation-state. In addition to these, social capital as a sum of these resources provides access to various resources and information.

To illuminate the impact of social networks on the society, Aihwa Ong (1999) and Donald Nonini (1997) look at the example of Chinese family and guanxi networks. Within these networks,

> familistic regimes dominated by men and the elderly not only regulate and exploit the labor power (whether compensated by wages or not) and reproductive power of family women, younger men, and children. These regimes also constitute subjects such as the ideal Chinese daughter through the discourse of Xiao, 'filial pity', and discipline them through forms of violence (Nonini 1997: 204).

These regimes are also continuously re-inscribed on members of the diaspora through factories and schools since regimes of social networks require the localization of disciplinable subjects (ibid.: 205). Thus, they represent the practices of pragmatism, interpersonal dependence, bodily discipline, gender and age hierarchies, and other ethnic-specific modes of social production and re-production in the diaspora (Ong 1999: 116). Essentially, the regimes of a social network develop rules, norms, regulations, and rituals, which increase the surveillance and control of the population in order to ensure its health, productivity, and security and to achieve optimum economic benefit and minimum socio-economic and political cost (Ong 1997: 172). The greater the extent of a social network, the greater the possibility for surveillance and control exists (Faist 2000: 113). The extent of a social network is crucial since each person within this regime is a link, indirectly tied to others in controlling the flow of information, resources, authority, and power.

From a broader perspective, the functions of social networks after German reunification resemble those laws, regulations, and institutions, which aim to keep market dynamics and market competition untouched, to maintain the principle of rule of law in the economic order, and to avoid anti-liberal policies. These constructions run parallel to the neoliberal understanding of capitalism,

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

which argues that it does not contradict itself as economic thought and that a competitive market society is possible. In that sense, social networks are conceptualized as social entities that help regulate the relationship between society and the economy. Within this context, it is useful to elucidate the impetus for the development of social networks for the promotion of tolerance in Berlin, through two brief examples: the Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz gegen Extremismus und Gewalt (BfDT, Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance against Extremism and Violence) and Initiative Hauptstadt Berlin e. V. (IHD, the Initiative for Capital City Berlin).

The BfDT was established in 2000 by the Federal Ministries of the Interior and of Justice, tasked with the promotion of tolerance and principles of democracy, which the government considers instrumental for the prevention of extremism and violence. The organization's networking is civil society-based, bringing together organizations, federations, action groups, and small initiatives through competitions, conferences/workshops, festivals, group discussions, and social activities. In this framework, BfDT emerges as a reflection of the German state approach to the mobilization of tolerance in the country. The act of connecting civil society actors in the name of tolerance, then, enables the authorities to conduct on the whole population or a group of people in a more sophisticated way.

At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify the institutional structure of the BfDT. Its main office in Berlin is responsible for the coordination and documentation of the organization's activities, the publication of the projects, the organization of the advisory council meetings, and the development of permanent contacts with groups and associations. As the political steering committee of the BfDT, its advisory council meets four times a year and is composed of representatives of the German Parliament, the federal government, and civil society. Civil society representatives are appointed by mutual agreement for a period of four years by the Federal Ministries of the Interior and Justice—directly contradicting the organization's own mission of promoting tolerance and democracy. Current advisor council members include representatives from the following organizations: the American Jewish Committee Berlin; the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future; the Society for the Promotion of Jewish Culture and Tradition; German Youth Sports Council (part of the German Olympic Confederation); two universities (Justus Liebig University Giessen and Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences); Against Oblivion—For Democracy; the Archive of Youth Cultures; the Anne Frank Center; Do not turn on my buddy!—the Organization for Equal Treatment, against Xenophobia and Racism; and the Network for Democracy and Courage. Conversely, representatives of the German Parliament are nominated by their respective factions (one representative for each of Germany's

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

major political parties—CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Die Linke, and FDP). Federal government representatives include parliamentary state secretaries from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the federal commissioner for immigration, refugees, and integration.

Moreover, as a part of its institutional identity, BfDT was incorporated into the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (BpB, Federal Agency for Civic Education) in 2011, although this restructuring did not change the organization's objectives. On the contrary, its integration into the historical development of the BpB clarified the reasons and methods behind the government's desire to construct networks for the promotion of tolerance (Hentges 2012). In a nutshell, the BpB's roots are in the domestic propaganda machinery of World War I: Initially founded as the Central Office for Domestic Propaganda, then the Reich Central Office for Domestic Propaganda during the Weimar Republic, it was finally incorporated into the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda during the Nazi period. In 1952, it was re-established as the Federal Agency for Domestic Propaganda, taking on its current name in 1963. Although the BpB has undergone various conceptual and organizational transformations since the 1950s, its objective to promote the political participation of German citizens has never functioned independently from German state policies. In this regard, situated within the BpB, the BfDT's role in developing networks for tolerance solidifies the organization as a facilitator for social control—an indirect form of control which occurs without the direct intervention of state institutions.

Consequently, the civic practices of tolerance that flow from the BfDT's networking activities are taken as examples of liberal egalitarianism by society. These practices are based on mechanisms of voluntary obligations, reciprocity, and solidarity as underlined in the Ministry of the Interior's own self-conception (BMI 1999): society's potential for self-regulation; transparency of public administration; boosts in participation by the population; transition from a society based on industrial production to a knowledge-based service society; performance-oriented and cost-efficient procedures; competing approaches; and responsible use of resources. Simultaneously, by developing networks for the promotion of tolerance, the BfDT turns itself into a symbol of the tolerant host that is capable of defining tolerance, its values and conditions, and the features of those who should be tolerated and not tolerated.

Initiative Hauptstadt Berlin e. V. (IHD, Initiative for Capital City Berlin) is the second example of an organization tasked with developing networks for the promotion of tolerance in Berlin. The IHD emerged as a civil society organization in 1990, with the goal of improving Berlin's image in the political, economic, and social circles as the capital city of reunified Germany. Similar to the BfDT, IHD's principal activities focus on education and the integration of different parts of society. Since its establishment, the executive boards

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

and advisory councils of the IHD have been composed of policymakers (at local, regional and national levels), business people, and members of political, economic, and cultural organizations. The Initiative accepts individual and corporate memberships. While individual membership is capped at €20 per month, corporations contribute according to their annual revenue (€600 annually for revenue less than €10 million; €1200 for revenue under €50 million; €1800 for revenue under €200 million; €2400 for revenue over €200 million). Currently, the IHD has 320 individual and 80 corporate members.

Within this institutional framework, the Initiative organizes monthly Capital City Forum talks (as well as publishing these talks), arranges events and festivals for its members, and supports projects through Capital City Prize for Integration and Tolerance. The framework of this prize was established in 2007, funded by a golf tournament organized by the IHD. Between 2011 and 2013, the federal commissioner for migration, refugees, and integration acted as the main sponsor of the prize, before the Ministry of Interior took over in 2014. Associations, groups and non-governmental institutions vie for the recognition of their projects through the awarding of first, second, third or special prizes.

The Capital City Prize for Integration and Tolerance intends to integrate people with "immigration background"[3] into "German" society, prevent the development of ghettoized communities, and promote tolerance toward communities with an immigrant background (IHD 2016). Although it is underlined that individuals with "immigration background" should not rid themselves of their national, cultural and religious identities, they should learn and respect the fundamentals of German-European identity reflected in particular historical periods (e.g. Ancient Greek and Roman periods, Christianity, the Holy Roman Empire, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Frankfurt Constitution, World Wars I and II, National Socialism, and Reunification). Since identity and homeland can only exist with an understanding of history, the rule of law and the German language are also inevitable elements of a successful integration process (IHD 2016). Accordingly, "German" society must support the integration attempts of migrants; and the prize should encourage the civil society projects in this direction.

In that sense, the IHD has supported several projects, including but not limited to intercultural music and sports competitions, culture and language events, neighborhood development activities, interreligious dialogue programs,

[3] In Germany, people with "immigration background" refer to those who immigrated into the territory of today's FRG after 1949, foreigners born in Germany, and persons born in Germany who have at least one parent who immigrated to the FRG or is a naturalized German citizen (Destatis 2018: 4).

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

and training workshops. While some of the projects were focused on districts popular with migrant communities and were initiated by migrant organizations, others did not specify a particular location and were carried out by "German" organizations. Nonetheless, all took "disadvantaged" migrant groups as the focus of their commitment.

Put differently, certain migrant groups have turned into a social dilemma—a concern, a fear, and a risk that needs to be dealt with, cared for, integrated, and tolerated. In this line of thought, the IHD (as a reflection of the mindset of the city's political and economic elites) has continued to develop networks through civil society organizations for the promotion of tolerance and to act—similarly to the BfDT—as the tolerating host, defining the limits of tolerance, and indicating the subjects of tolerance. Both the IHD and the BfDT are therefore social entities that help to regulate the relationships between (tolerated or not-tolerated) migrants and the state. Or, as Antonio Gramsci puts it in his *Prison Notebooks*, "it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion). In a doctrine of the State which conceives the latter as tendentially capable of withering away and of being subsumed into regulated society, the argument is a fundamental one. It is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering away by degrees, as ever-more conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance" (1992: 262–263).

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I brought together snapshots from the practices and narratives of public and private institutions in Berlin, each of which documents ways of measuring, exhibiting and networking for tolerance. Although these practices and narratives emerge out of different structures and follow separate patterns of development, they underline that the concept of tolerance is a conditional acceptance of things, ideas, and groups of people, that are to be included in the social order. Hence, it remains an indicator of the power relations between the tolerating and tolerated parties. The promotion of tolerance, however, is not unique to the economic, political, social and cultural development of Berlin. From a broader viewpoint, it has been taking place all around the world, in particular since the declaration of the International Day for Tolerance in 1995.

Referencing the relevant international conventions on human rights, the declaration of principles on toleration warns the members states of the United Nations against the rise of acts of intolerance, violence, terrorism, xenophobia,

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

aggressive nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination in the context of a globalized economy, large-scale migrations, the displacement of populations, and changing social patterns (UNESCO 1995). To fight against the above-mentioned threats, the declaration called for the promotion of tolerance and the active involvement of state institutions, civil society, the private sector, the media, and educational institutions through programs, conferences, policies, public awareness events, research, and publications. This plea for tolerance can be explained by means of Wendy Brown's historical contextualization:

> Tolerance surged back into use in the late twentieth century as multiculturalism became a central problematic of liberal democratic citizenship; as Third World immigration threatened the ethnicized identities of Europe, North America, and Australia; as indigenous peoples pursued claims of reparation, belonging, and entitlement; as ethnically coded civil conflict became a critical site of international disorder; and as Islamic religious identity intensified and expanded into a transnational political force. Tolerance talk also became prominent as domestic norms of integration and assimilation gave way to concerns with identity and difference on the left and as the rights claims of various minorities were spurned as "special" rather than universal on the right (2006: 2).

In her book, Wendy Brown questions the concept of tolerance within the Western liberal world, with a focus on examples from the United States, by means of seven aspects: "tolerance as a discourse of de-politicization," "tolerance as a discourse of power," "tolerance as supplement," "tolerance as governmentality," "tolerance as museum object," "subjects of tolerance," and "tolerance as/in civilizational discourse." She criticizes the culturalization of politics, which situates differences (e.g. racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual identities) within the private sphere by using tolerance discourses. These discourses, consequently, neglect the historical and political contexts of difference and essentialize the interpretation of identity. They also regenerate societal power relationships by reflecting on "foreign" people, and by concealing political claims for equality and justice outside of the public sphere. Last but not least, on the international level, tolerance discourses represent the "civilizing" function (Orientalist hegemony) of liberal Western nation-states.

Although Brown's explication of these tolerance discourses could describe the promotion of tolerance in Berlin, this article seeks to separate its critique from that of Brown's for two reasons. First, as Slavoj Žižek highlights (2008: 666), Brown's claims are still within the trajectory of tolerant liberalism, since she proposes a liberalism that is aware of its own Eurocentric approach:

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

> This book seeks to lay bare this political landscape. It contests the culturalization of politics that tolerance discourse draws from and promulgates, and contests as well the putatively a-cultural nature of liberalism. The normative premise animating this contestation is that a more democratic global future involves affirming rather than denying and disavowing liberalism's cultural facets and its imprint by particular cultures. Such an affirmation would undermine liberalism's claims to universalism and liberalism's status as culturally neutral in brokering the tolerable. This erosion, in turn, would challenge the standing of liberal regimes as uniquely, let alone absolutely, tolerant, revealing them instead to be as self-affirming and Other-rejecting as many other regimes. It would also reveal liberalism's proximity to and bouts of forthright engagement with fundamentalism.
>
> The recognition of liberalism as cultural is more than a project of debunking its airs of superiority or humiliating its hubristic reach. Rather, insofar as it makes explicit the inherent hybridity or impurity of every instantiation of liberalism, it underscores the impossibility of any liberalism ever being "only liberalism" and the extent to which both form and content are potted, historical, local, lived. It reveals liberalism as always already being the issue of miscegenation with its fundamentalist Other, as containing this Other within, and thus as having a certain potential for recognizing and connecting with this Other without. In this possibility may be contained liberalism's prospects for renewal, even for redemption, or at the very least for more modest and peaceful practices (Brown 2006: 24).

Žižek argues that Brown's limitation lies in the fact that her arguments reiterate the notion that modern Europeans as constantly changing whereas other civilizations remain culturally rigid (2008: 667). It is at this point that Brown's rejection of liberalism's claim of universality without culture (a false universality, as Žižek calls it) misses the main struggle against tolerance.

> Actual universality is not the deep feeling that, above all differences, different civilizations share the same basic values; actual universality appears (actualizes itself) as the experience of negativity, of the inadequacy-to-itself of a particular identity. The formula of revolutionary solidarity is not let us tolerate our differences, it is not a pact of civilizations, but a pact of struggles that cut across civilizations, a pact between what, in each civilization, undermines its identity from within, fights against its oppressive kernel. What unites us is the same struggle. A better formula would thus be: in spite of our differences, we can

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

> identify the basic antagonism of the antagonistic struggle in which we are both caught; so let us share our intolerance and join forces in the same struggle. In other words, in the emancipatory struggle, it is not the cultures in their identity that join hands; it is the repressed, the exploited and suffering, the parts of no-part of every culture that come together in a shared struggle (Žižek 2008: 673–674).

Second, while Brown's strength in attacking a contemporary tolerance of liberalism is to be saluted, t this chapter distances itself from Brown's critique insofar as her reading of Michel Foucault's governmentality remains very limited. According to her, Foucault's account is problematic since it lessens the role of the state in theorizing modern political power, and thus misses the point that tolerance is a crucial element in the legitimization of state violence (Brown 2006: 82). Although it is not within the scope of this chapter to engage in a detailed reading of Foucault's governmentality, it is helpful to briefly clarify the concept here. Governmentality emerges, according to Foucault, at the intersection of two techniques, namely,

> technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immorality (Foucault 1988: 18).

This broader framework does not diminish the state's role (as it is argued by Brown); rather, it opens up different possibilities for its physical and symbolic violence through tolerance. As presented in this article, public and private institutions, as well as civil society organizations in Berlin, take part in the definition and implementation of a specific form of tolerance toward certain groups of people through particular narratives and practices of measuring, exhibiting and networking for tolerance. In so doing, this promotion of tolerance asserts the superior position of the tolerant over those to be guided toward certain ends. From a methodological point of view, where one questions the conditions of possibility, this relation can be seen as a point of contact in terms of tactics and strategies of power.

> The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail—but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, or strategies and tactics (Foucault 2000: 116).

Bibliography

Baur, Joachim (ed.) (2010): Museumsanalyse. Methoden und Konturen eines neuen Forschungsfeldes. Bielefeld: Transkript.

Baur, Joachim (2009): Die Musealisierung der Migration. Einwanderungsmuseen und die Inszenierung der multikulturellen Nation. Bielefeld: Transkript.

Beier-de Haan, Rosmarie (ed.) (2005): Zuwanderungsland Deutschland: Migrationen 1500—2005. Berlin: Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum.

Beier-de Haan, Rosmarie and Werquet, Jan (eds.) (2009): Fremde? Bilder von den "Anderen" in Deutschland und Frankreich seit 1871. Berlin: Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum.

Beneke, Sabine and Ottomeyer, Hans (eds.) (2005): Zuwanderungsland Deutschland: Die Hugenotten. Berlin: Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum.

Berlin Partner GmbH (2018): Denk mal an Freiheit! Online: https://www.berlin-partner.de/nc/presse/presseinformationen/detailansicht/denk-mal-an-freiheit/ [accessed 15 Oct 2018].

BIfBE, Berlin Institute für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung (2018): Über uns. Online: https://www.berlin-institut.org/ueber-uns/foerderung.html [accessed 15 Jun 2019).

BIfBE, Berlin Institute für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung (2011): Die ersten 10 Jahre. Berlin: BIfBE.

Biskup, Daniel and Schalenberg, Marc (2008): Selling Berlin—Imagebildung und Stadtmarketing von der preußischen Residenz bis zur Bundeshauptstadt. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1986): „The Forms of Capital". In: John G. Richardson (ed.): Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology Education. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 241–285.

Brown, Wendy (2006): Regulating Aversion, Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Bundesministerium des Innern (1999): Moderner Staat—Moderne Verwaltung. Berlin: Druck Center Meckenheim.

Coleman, James (1988): "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital". In: American Journal of Sociology, 94, pp. 95–121.

Colomb, Claire (2012): Staging the New Berlin: Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989. Routledge: London.

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Çağlar, Ayşe (1997): "Hyphenated Identities and the Limits of Culture: Some Methodological Queries". In: Tariq Modood and Prina Jane Werbner (eds.): The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity, Community. New York: Zed Publications, pp. 169–185.

Destatis (2018): Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

Dobbernack, Jan and Modood, Tariq (eds.) (2013): Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect. Hard to Accept? London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Faist, Thomas (2000): The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Florida, Richard (2012): The Rise of the Creative Class, Revisited. New York: Basic Books.

Florida, Richard (2005): Cities and The Creative Class. New York: Routledge.

Forst, Rainer (2013): Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, Michel (2000): "Truth and Power". In: James D. Faubion (ed.): Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. New York: The New Press, pp. 111–133.

Foucault, Michel (1988): "Technologies of the Self". In: Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.): Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, pp. 16–48.

Gramsci, Antonio (1992): Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.

Gudrun, Hentges (2012): Staat und politische Bildung. Von der "Zentrale für Heimatdienst" zur "Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung". Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Gupta, Akhil and Ferguson, James (1992): "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference". In: Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (eds.): Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 33–51.

Heyd, David (ed.) (1996): Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hoad, T.F. (1996): Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ICOM, International Council of Museums (2018): Museum Definition. Online: https://icom.museum/en/activities/standards-guidelines/museum-definition/ [accessed 15 Jan 2019].

IHD, Initiative Hauptstadt Berlin e. V. (2016). Präambel des Hauptstadtpreises für Integration und Toleranz. Online: https://ihb.berlin/category/projekte/hauptstadtpreis-projekte/ [accessed 15 Jan 2019].

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

IOM (International Organization for Migration) and UNESCO (2006): Expert Meeting on Migration Museums. Rome: Italian National Commission for UNESCO.
Koselleck, Reinhart (2002): Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Koselleck, Reinhart (2006): "Crisis". In: Journal of History of Ideas, 67, 2, pp. 357–400.
Kröhnert, Steffen/Morgenstern, Annegret and Klingholz, Reiner (2007): Talente, Technologie und Toleranz—wo Deutschland Zukunft hat. Berlin: BIfBE.
Levinas, Emmanuel (1969): Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1992): Tristes tropiques. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Marcuse, Peter (2003): "Review of The Rise of the Creative Class by Richard Florida". In: Urban Land, 62, pp. 40–41.
Merkel, Angela (2006): Nr. 116–3, 18 Nov 2006. Bulletin der Bundesregierung (unpubl.).
Ong, Aihwa (1999): Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke University Press.
Peck, Jamie (2005): "Struggling with the Creative Class". In: International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29, 4, pp. 740–770.
Pfeifer, Wolfgang (1989): Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Popper, Karl (2013 [1945]): The Open Society and Its Enemies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Rawls, John (2005 [1971]): A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schierup, Carl-Ulrik/ Hansen, Peo and Castles, Stephen (2006): Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Neil (2002): New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy. In Antipode, 34, 3, pp. 427–450.
Stepan, Alfred and Taylor, Charles (eds.) (2014): Boundaries of Toleration. New York: Columbia University Press.
SHGBD, Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2016): Immer bunter. Einwanderungsland Deutschland. Bonn: SHGBD.
UNESCO (1995): Declaration of Principles on Tolerance. Online: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13175andURL_DO=DO_TOPICandURL_SECTION=201.html [accessed 15 Jul 2019].
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979): The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Walzer, Michael (1997): On Toleration. New Haven. Yale University Press.
Wedgwood, Hensleigh (1872): A Dictionary of English Etymology. London: Trübner.
Wolff, Robert Paul/Moore, Barrington and Marcuse, Herbert (1965): A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston: Beacon Press.
Žižek, Slavoj (2008): "Tolerance as an Ideological Category". In: Critical Inquiry, 34, pp. 660–682.

This content downloaded from 195.37.142.79 on Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:02:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms